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Abstract
In this paper, we study the dividend strategies for a shareholder with non-constant discount
rate in a diffusion risk model. We assume that the dividends can only be paid at a bounded rate
and restrict ourselves to Markov strategies. This is a time inconsistent control problem. The
equilibrium HJB-equation is given and the verification theorem is proved for a general discount
function. Considering a mixture of exponential discount functions and a pseudo-exponential
discount function, we get equilibrium dividend strategies and the corresponding equilibrium
value functions by solving the equilibrium HJB-equations.
Keywords: Dividend strategies; Non-exponential discounting; Time inconsistence; Equilib-
rium strategies; Equilibrium HJB-equation
1 Introduction
Since it was proposed by De Finetti (1957), the optimization of dividend strategy has been inves-
tigated by many researchers under various risk models. This problem is usually phrased as the
management’s problem of determining the optimal timing and the size of dividend payments in the
presence of bankruptcy risk. For more literature on this problem, we refer the reader to a recent
survey paper by Avanzi (2009).
In the very rich literature, a common assumption is that the discount rate is constant over time so
the discount function is exponential. However, some empirical studies of human behavior suggest
that the assumption of constant discount rate is unrealistic, see, e.g., Thaler (1981), Ainslie (1992)
and Loewenstein and Prelec (1992). Indeed, there is experimental evidence that people are impatient
about choices in the short term but are more patient when choosing between long-term alternatives.
More precisely, events in the near future tend to be discounted at a higher rate than events that occur
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in the long run. Considering such effect, individual behavior is best described by the hyperbolic
discounting (see Phelps and Pollak (1968)), which has been extensively studied in the areas of mi-
croeconomics, macroeconomics, and behavioral finance, such as Laibson (1997) and Barro (1999)
among others.
However, difficulties arise when we try to solve an optimal control problem with a non-constant
discount rate by the standard dynamic programming approach. In fact, the standard optimal control
techniques give rise to time inconsistent strategies, i.e, a strategy that is optimal for the initial time
may be not optimal later. This is the so-called time inconsistent control problem and the classical
dynamic programming principle does no longer hold. Strotz (1955) studies the time inconsistent
problem within a game theoretic framework by using Nash equilibrium points. They seek the equi-
librium policy as the solution of a subgame-perfect equilibrium where the players are the agent and
her future selves.
Recently, there is an increasing attention in the time inconsistent control problem due to the
practical applications in economics and finance. A modified HJB equation is derived in Marín-
Solano and Navas (2010) which solves an optimal consumption and investment problem with the
non-constant discount rate for both naive and sophisticated agents. A similar problem is also con-
sidered by another approach in Ekeland and Lazrak (2006) and Ekeland and Pirvu (2008), which
provide the precise definition of the equilibrium concept in continuous time for the first time. They
characterize the equilibrium policies through the solutions of a flow of BSDEs, and they show,
for a special form of the discount factor, that this BSDE reduces to a system of two ODEs which
has a solution. Considering the hyperbolic discounting, Ekeland et al. (2012) studies the portfolio
management problem for an investor who is allowed to consume and take out life insurance, and
they characterize the equilibrium strategy by an integral equation. Following this definition of the
equilibrium strategy, Björk and Murgoci (2010) studied the time-inconsistent control problem in a
general Markov framework, and derived the equilibrium HJB-equation together with the verification
theorem. Björk et al. (2012) studied the Markowitz’s problem with state-dependent risk aversion by
utilizing the equilibrium HJB-equation obtained in Björk and Murgoci (2010).
In this paper, we study the dividend strategies for the shareholders with non-constant discount
rate in a diffusion risk model. We assume that the dividends can only be paid at a bounded rate and
restrict ourselves to Markov strategies. We use the equilibrium HJB-equation to solve this problem.
In contrast to the papers mentioned above which consider a fixed time horizon or an infinite time
horizon, in the dividend problem the ruin risk should be taken into account and the time horizon is
a random variable (the time of ruin). Thus, the equilibrium HJB-equation given in this paper looks
different with the one obtained in Björk and Murgoci (2010). We first give the equilibrium HJB-
equation which is motivated by Yong (2012) and the verification theorem for a general discount
function. Then we solve the equilibrium HJB-equation for two special non-exponential discount
functions: a mixture of exponential discount function and a pseudo-exponential discount function.
For more details about these discount functions, we refer the reader to Ekeland and Lazrak (2006)
and Ekeland and Pirvu (2008). Under the mixture of exponential discount function, our results show
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that if the bound of the dividend rate is small enough then the equilibrium strategy is to always pay
the maximal dividend rate; otherwise, the equilibrium strategy is to pay the maximal dividend rate
when the surplus is above a barrier and pay nothing when the surplus is below the barrier. Given
some conditions, the results are similar under the pseudo-exponential discount function. These fea-
tures of the equilibrium dividend strategies are similar to the optimal strategies obtained in Asmussen
and Taksar (1997) which considers the exponential discounting in the diffusion risk model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The dividend problem and the definition
of an equilibrium strategy are given in Section 2. The equilibrium HJB-equation and a verification
theorem are presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we study two cases with a mixture of exponential
discount functions and a pseudo-exponential discount function.
2 The model
In the case of no control, the surplus process is assumed to follow
dXt = µdt +σdWt, t ≥ 0,
where µ,σ are positive constants and {Wt}t≥0 is a one-dimensional standard Brownian motion on a
filtered probability space
(
Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0 ,P) satisfying the usual hypotheses. The filtration {Ft}t≥0 is
completed and generated by {Wt}t≥0.
A dividend strategy is described by a stochastic process {lt}t≥0. Here, lt ≥ 0 is the rate of dividend
payout at time t which is assumed to be bounded by a constant M > 0. We restrict ourselves to the
feedback control strategies (Markov strategies), i.e. at time t, the control lt is given by
lt = pi(t, x),
where x is the surplus level at time t and the control law pi : [0,∞)× [0,∞) → [0,M] is a Borel
measurable function.
When applying the control law pi, we denote by {Xpit }t≥0 the controlled risk process. Considering
the controlled system starting from the initial time t ∈ [0,∞), {Xpis } evolves according todX
pi
s = µds +σdWs−pi(s,Xpis )ds, s ≥ t,
Xpit = x.
(2.1)
Let
τpit := inf
{
s ≥ t : Xpis ≤ 0
}
be the time of ruin under the control law pi. Without loss of generality, we assume that Xpis ≡ 0 for
s ≥ τpit .
Let h : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) be a discount function which satisfies h(0) = 1, h(s)≥ 0 and ∫ ∞0 h(t)dt <∞.
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Furthermore, h is assumed to be continuously differentiable on [0,∞) and h′(x) ≤ 0.
Definition 2.1. A control law pi is said to be admissible if it satisfies: 0 ≤ pi(t, x) ≤ M for all (t, x) ∈
[0,∞)× [0,∞), pi(t,0) ≡ 0 for all t ∈ [0,∞). We denote by Π the set of all admissible control laws.
For a given admissible control law pi and an initial state (t, x) ∈ [0,∞)× [0,∞), we define the
return function Vpi by
Vpi(t, x) = Et,x
∫ τpit
t
h(s− t)pi(s,Xpis )ds
 ,
where Et,x[·] is the expectation conditioned on the event {Xpit = x}. Note that for any admissible
strategy pi ∈ Π, we have
Et,x
∫ τpit
t
∣∣∣h(s− t)pi(s,Xpis )∣∣∣ds ≤ M∫ ∞
0
h(t)dt <∞, ∀(t, x) ∈ [0,∞)× [0,∞), (2.2)
which means the performance functions Vpi(t, x) are well-defined for all admissible strategies.
In classical risk theory, the optimal dividend strategy, denoted by pi∗, is an admissible strategy
such that
Vpi
∗
(t, x) = sup
pi∈Π
Vpi(t, x).
However, in our settings, this optimization problem is time-inconsistent in the sense that the Bellman
optimality principle fails.
Similar to Ekeland and Pirvu (2008) and Björk and Murgoci (2010), we view the entire problem
as a non-cooperative game and look for Nash equilibria for the game. More specifically, we consider
a game with one player for each time t, where player t can be regarded as the future incarnation of
the decision maker at time t. Given state (t, x), player t will choose a control action pi(t, x), and she/he
wants to maximize the functional Vpi(t, x). In the continuous-time model, Ekeland and Lazrak (2006)
and Ekeland and Pirvu (2008) give the precise definition of this equilibrium strategy for the first time.
Intuitively, equilibrium strategies are the strategies such that, given that they will be implemented in
the future, it is optimal to implement them right now.
Definition 2.2. Choose a control law pˆi ∈Π, a fixed l ∈ [0,M] and a fixed real number  > 0. For any
fixed initial point (t, x) ∈ [0,∞)× [0,∞), we define the control law pi by
pi(s,y) =

0, for s ∈ [t,∞), y = 0;
l, for s ∈ [t, t + ], y ∈ (0,∞);
pˆi(s,y), for s ∈ [t + ,∞), y ∈ (0,∞).
If
liminf
→0
V pˆi(t, x)−Vpi (t, x)

≥ 0,
for all l ∈ [0,M], we say that pˆi is an equilibrium control law. And the equilibrium value function V
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is defined by
V(t, x) = V pˆi(t, x). (2.3)
In the following section, we will first give the equilibrium HJB-equation for the equilibrium
value function V , and then prove a verification theorem.
3 The equilibrium Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equation
In this section, we consider the objective function having the form
Vpi(t, x) = Et,x
∫ τpit
t
C
(
t, s,pi(s,Xpis )
)
ds
 , (3.1)
where C
(
t, s,pi(s,Xpis )
)
= h(s− t)pi(s,Xpis ), for s ≥ t.
For all pi ∈ Π and any real valued function f (t, x) ∈ C1,2 ([0,∞)× (0,∞)), which means that the
partial derivatives ∂ f∂t ,
∂ f
∂x ,
∂2 f
∂x2 exist and are continuous on [0,∞)× (0,∞), we define the infinitesimal
generator Lpi by
Lpi f (t, x) = ∂ f
∂t
(t, x) + (µ−pi(t, x)) ∂ f
∂x
(t, x) +
1
2
σ2
∂2 f
∂x2
(t, x).
LetD[0,∞) := {(s, t) | 0 ≤ s ≤ t <∞}. The following equilibrium HJB-equation is motivated by
Equation (4.77) of Yong (2012) and the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Definition 3.1. For a smooth function c(s, t, x) defined on D[0,∞)× [0,∞), the equilibrium HJB-
equation is given by
∂c
∂t (s, t, x) + H
(
s, t,φ
(
t, t, ∂c∂x (t, t, x),
∂2c
∂x2 (t, t, x)
)
, ∂c∂x (s, t, x),
∂2c
∂x2 (s, t, x)
)
= 0,
∀(s, t, x) ∈ D[0,∞)× (0,∞),
c(s, t,0) = 0, ∀(s, t) ∈ D[0,∞),
(3.2)
where H(s, t, l, p,P) =
1
2σ
2P + (µ− l)p +C(s, t, l),
φ(s, t, p,P) = argmax H(s, t, ·, p,P),
(3.3)
for (s, t, l, p,P) ∈ D[0,∞)× [0,M]×R2.
Since the equilibrium HJB-equation given in Definition 3.1 is informal, we are now giving a
strict verification theorem.
Theorem 3.2. (Verification Theorem) Assume that there exists a bounded function c(s, t, x), which is
smooth enough, solves the equilibrium HJB-equation in Definition 3.1. Let
pˆi(t, x) := φ
(
t, t,
∂c
∂x
(t, t, x),
∂2c
∂x2
(t, t, x)
)
(3.4)
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and
V(t, x) := c(t, t, x). (3.5)
If for any (s, t, x) ∈ D[0,∞)× [0,∞) it holds that
lim
n→∞c(s, τn,X
pˆi
τn) = 0, a.s., (3.6)
where τn = n∧τpˆit ,n ≥ t, n = 1,2, · · · , and Xpˆi is the unique solution to the SDE (2.1) with pi replaced
by pˆi and initial state (t, x), then pˆi given by (3.4) is an equilibrium control law, and V given by (3.5)
is the corresponding equilibrium value function.
Proof. We give the proof in two steps: 1. We show that V is the value function corresponding to pˆi,
i.e., V(t, x) = V pˆi(t, x); 2. We prove that pˆi is indeed the equilibrium control law which is defined by
Definition 2.2.
Step 1.
With (3.4), we rewrite (3.2) asL
pˆic(s, t, x) +C(s, t, pˆi(t, x)) = 0, (s, t, x) ∈ D[0,∞)× (0,∞),
c(s, t,0) = 0, ∀(s, t) ∈ D[0,∞),
(3.7)
where the operator Lpˆi applies to the function c(s, ·, ·).
By (3.7), applying Dynkin’s formula to the function c(s, ·, ·) yields that
c(s, t, x) = Et,x
[
c
(
s, τn,Xpˆiτn
)]
−Et,x
[∫ τn
t
Lpˆic
(
s,z,Xpˆiz
)
dz
]
= Et,x
[
c
(
s, τn,Xpˆiτn
)]
+Et,x
[∫ τn
t
C(s,z, pˆi(z,Xpˆiz ))dz
]
.
Recalling Definition 2.1 of admissible strategies (see also (2.2)), for given s ≤ t, we have
Et,x
∫ τpˆit
t
∣∣∣∣C (s,z, pˆi(z,Xpˆiz ))∣∣∣∣dz <∞, ∀(t, x) ∈ [0,∞)× [0,∞).
Since c(·, ·, ·) is bounded, by (3.6), letting n→∞ and applying dominated convergence theorem yield
that
c(s, t, x) = Et,x
∫ τpˆit
t
h(z− s)pˆi(z,Xpˆiz )dz
 , (s, t, x) ∈ D[0,∞)× [0,∞). (3.8)
Thus, we have
V(t, x) := c(t, t, x) = V pˆi(t, x).
Step 2. For a given l ∈ [0,M], and a fixed real number  > 0, we define pi by Definition 2.2.
For simplicity, we denote by X the path under the control law pi . Without loss of generality, we
consider the case where  is sufficient small such that t +  < τpi

t ∧ τpˆit . By the definition of Vpi, we
6
obtain
V pˆi(t, x)−Vpi (t, x) = Et,x
∫ τpˆit
t
C
(
t, s, pˆi
(
s,Xpˆis
))
ds−
∫ τpit
t
C
(
t, s,pi
(
s,Xs
))
ds

= Et,x
[∫ t+
t
h(s− t)
(
pˆi
(
s,Xpˆis
)
−pi (s,Xs))ds]
+Et,x
[
V pˆi
(
t + ,Xpˆit+
)
−V pˆi (t + ,Xt+)]
+Et,x
∫ τpˆit
t+
(h (s− t)−h (s− t− )) pˆi
(
s,Xpˆis
)
ds

−Et,x
∫ τpi

t
t+
(h (s− t)−h (s− t− )) pˆi (s,Xs)ds
 . (3.9)
Here pˆi(s,Xs) and pˆi(s,X
pˆi
s ) are the equilibrium control processes associated with the paths of X
 and
Xpˆi, respectively.
According to the equation (3.9), we now consider the limitation lim→0 V
pˆi(t,x)−Vpi (t,x)
 in three
parts separately:
1. Noting that
∫ ∞
0 h(t)dt < ∞, l and pˆi are bounded and applying the dominated convergence
theorem, we get
lim
→0
Et,x
[∫ t+
t h(s− t)
(
pˆi
(
s,Xpˆis
)
−pi (s,Xs))ds]

= pˆi (t, x)−pi(t, x).
2. We rewrite the second part in the right-side of the equation (3.9) by
Et,x
[
V pˆi
(
t + ,Xpˆit+
)
−V pˆi (t + ,Xt+)]
= Et,x
[
V pˆi
(
t + ,Xpˆit+
)
−V pˆi (t, x)
]
−Et,x
[
V pˆi
(
t + ,Xt+
)−V pˆi (t, x)]
= Et,x
[∫ t+
t
dV pˆi
(
u,Xpˆiu
)]
−Et,x
[∫ t+
t
dV pˆi
(
u,Xu
)]
.
Applying the Itô formula, we get
lim
→0
Et,x
[∫ t+
t dV
pˆi
(
u,Xpˆiu
)]

=
∂V pˆi(t, x)
∂t
+ (µ− pˆi (t, x)) ∂V
pˆi(t, x)
∂x
+
1
2
σ2
∂2V pˆi(t, x)
∂x2
=
(
LpˆiV pˆi
)
(t, x)
=
(
LpˆiV
)
(t, x) ,
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and
lim
→0
Et,x
[∫ t+
t dV
pˆi (u,Xu)]

=
∂V pˆi(t, x)
∂t
+ (µ− l) ∂V
pˆi(t, x)
∂x
+
1
2
σ2
∂2V pˆi(t, x)
∂x2
=
(
LpiV pˆi
)
(t, x)
=
(
LpiV
)
(t, x) .
3. Considering the cases with τpˆit ≥ τpi

t and τ
pˆi
t ≤ τpi

t and noting that pˆi
(
s,Xs
) ≡ 0 for s ≥ τpit , we
have
Et,x
∫ τpˆit
t+
(h (s− t)−h (s− t− )) pˆi
(
s,Xpˆis
)
ds

−Et,x
∫ τpi

t
t+
(h (s− t)−h (s− t− )) pˆi (s,Xs)ds

≥Et,x
∫ τpˆit
t+
(h (s− t)−h (s− t− ))
[
pˆi
(
s,Xpˆis
)
− pˆi (s,Xs)]ds .
Noting that pˆi is bounded and
∫ ∞
0 h(s)ds <∞, by the dominated convergence theorem, we get
lim
→0
Et,x
[∫ τpˆit
t+ [h (s− t)−h (s− t− )]
(
pˆi
(
s,Xpˆis
)
− pˆi (s,Xs))ds]

= 0.
Therefore, we obtain
lim
→0
V pˆi(t, x)−Vpi (t, x)

≥
[
LpˆiV (t, x) +C (t, t, pˆi(t, x))
]
−
[
LpiV (t, x) +C (t, t,pi (t, x))] . (3.10)
It follows from (3.3) and (3.4) that(
LpˆiV
)
(t, x) +C (t, t, pˆi(t, x)) = sup
pi∈Π
{(LpiV) (t, x) +C (t, t,pi(t, x))} . (3.11)
Therefore, (3.10) and (3.11) imply that
lim
→0
V pˆi(t, x)−Vpi (t, x)

≥ 0.
This completes the proof. 
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4 Solutions to Two Special Cases
In this section, we try to find a solution of the equilibrium HJB-equation in Definition 3.1 for specific
discount functions. First of all, we make a conjecture of equilibrium strategy for a general discount
function. Since
H(s, t, l, p,P) =
1
2
σ2P + (µ− l)p +C(s, t, l)
=
1
2
σ2P +µp + [h(t− s)− p]l,
we have
φ(s, t, p,P) =
0, if p ≥ h(t− s),M, if p < h(t− s).
We assume that there exists a constant b≥ 0 such that ∂c∂x (t, t, x)≥ 1, if 0≤ x < b, and ∂c∂x (t, t, x)< 1,
if x ≥ b. Thus, the equilibrium strategy is given by
pˆi(t, x) = φ
(
t, t,
∂c
∂x
(t, t, x),
∂2c
∂x2
(t, t, x)
)
=
0, if 0 ≤ x < b,M, if x ≥ b. (4.1)
Then the equilibrium HJB-equation (3.2) becomes
∂c
∂t (s, t, x) +
1
2σ
2 ∂2c
∂x2 (s, t, x) +µ
∂c
∂x (s, t, x) = 0, (s, t, x) ∈ D[0,∞)× (0,b),
∂c
∂t (s, t, x) +
1
2σ
2 ∂2c
∂x2 (s, t, x) + (µ−M) ∂c∂x (s, t, x) + h(t− s)M = 0, (s, t, x) ∈ D[0,∞)× [b,∞),
c(s, t,0) = 0, ∀(s, t) ∈ D[0,∞).
(4.2)
4.1 A Mixture of Exponential Discount Functions
Let us consider a case where the dividends are proportionally paid to N inhomogenous shareholders.
In terms of inhomogenous, we mean that the shareholders have different discount rates. Then given
a control law pi, the return function is
Vpi(t, x) =
N∑
i=1
Et,x
∫ τpit
t
ωie−δi(z−t)pi(z,Xpiz )dz
 ,
where ωi > 0 satisfying
∑N
i=1ωi = 1 is the proportion at which the dividends are paid to the share-
holders, δi > 0, i = 1,2, · · · ,N, are the constant discount rates of the shareholders, respectively.
In fact, a mixture of exponential discount functions is used in the above example. We consider a
discount function defined by
h(t) =
N∑
i=1
ωie−δit, t ≥ 0, (4.3)
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where δi > 0, and ωi > 0 satisfies
∑N
i=1ωi = 1.
We consider the following ansatz:
c(s, t, x) =
N∑
i=1
ωie−δi(t−s)Vi(x), (s, t, x) ∈ D[0,∞)× [0,∞), (4.4)
where the functions Vi(x), i = 1,2, · · · ,N, are given by the system of ODEs
1
2σ
2 ∂2Vi
∂x2 (x) +µ
∂Vi
∂x (x)−δiVi(x) = 0, x ∈ [0,b),
1
2σ
2 ∂2Vi
∂x2 (x) + (µ−M) ∂Vi∂x (x)−δiVi(x) + M = 0, x ∈ [b,∞),
Vi(0) = 0.
(4.5)
Denote by θ1(η,c) and −θ2(η,c) the positive and negative roots of the equation 12σ2y2 +ηy−c = 0,
respectively. Then θ1(η,c) =
−η+
√
η2+2σ2c
σ2
,
θ2(η,c) =
η+
√
η2+2σ2c
σ2
.
Thus a general solution of the equation (4.5) has the form
Vi(x) =
Ci1e
θ1(µ,δi)x +Ci2e−θ2(µ,δi)x, x ∈ [0,b),
M
δi
+Ci3eθ1(µ−M,δi)x +Ci4e−θ2(µ−M,δi)x, x ∈ [b,∞),
(4.6)
for i = 1,2, · · · ,N.
Since Vi(0) = 0, and Vi(x) > 0, for all x > 0, we have Ci1 = −Ci2 := Ci > 0, i = 1,2, · · · ,N. Since
we are looking for a bounded function c(·, ·, ·) (see Theorem 3.2), we have Ci3 = 0, i = 1,2, · · · ,N. To
simplify the notation, let Ci4 := −di, i = 1,2, · · · ,N.
Now to find the value of Ci,di, i = 1,2, · · · ,N and b, we use “the principle of smooth fit” to get
Vi(b+) = Vi(b−), i = 1,2, · · · ,N,
V′i (b+) = V
′
i (b−), i = 1,2, · · · ,N,
∂c
∂x (t, t,b+) = 1
(
or equivalently, ∂c∂x (t, t,b−) = 1
)
.
(4.7)
Therefore by denoting
θi1 = θ1(µ,δi), θi2 = θ2(µ,δi), θi3 = θ2(µ−M, δi), i = 1,2, · · · ,N,
we can rewrite (4.7) as for i = 1,2, · · · ,N,
Ci
(
eθi1b− e−θi2b
)
=
M
δi
−die−θi3b, (4.8)
Ci
(
θi1eθi1b + θi2e−θi2b
)
= diθi3e−θi3b, (4.9)
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and
N∑
i=1
ωiCi
(
θi1eθi1b + θi2e−θi2b
)
= 1. (4.10)
From (4.8) - (4.9) we can get Ci and di in the expression of b:
Ci =
Mθi3
δi
[
(θi1 + θi3)eθi1b + (θi2− θi3)e−θi2b
]−1
, (4.11)
di =
M
δi
eθi3b
θi1eθi1b + θi2e−θi2b
(θi1 + θi3)eθi1b + (θi2− θi3)e−θi2b , (4.12)
for i = 1,2, · · · ,N.
Substituting Ci into (4.10), we obtain
N∑
i=1
ωi
Mθi3
δi
θi1eθi1b + θi2e−θi2b
(θi1 + θi3)eθi1b + (θi2− θi3)e−θi2b = 1.
Let
F(b) :=
N∑
i=1
ωi
Mθi3
δi
θi1eθi1b + θi2e−θi2b
(θi1 + θi3)eθi1b + (θi2− θi3)e−θi2b −1.
Lemma 4.1. If
∑N
i=1ωi
Mθi3
δi
> 1, then F(b) = 0 has a unique positive solution.
Proof. The condition
∑N
i=1ωi
Mθi3
δi
> 1 implies that F(0) > 0. From Lemma 2.1 of Asmussen and
Taksar (1997), we know that
M
δi
− 1
θi3
− 1
θi1
< 0, i = 1,2, · · · ,N.
Thus,
F(+∞) =
N∑
i=1
ωi
Mθi3
δi
θi1
θi1 + θi3
−1
=
N∑
i=1
ωi
(
Mθi3
δi
θi1
θi1 + θi3
−1
)
=
N∑
i=1
ωi
θi1θi3
θi1 + θi3
(
M
δi
− 1
θi3
− 1
θi1
)
< 0.
Furthermore, we have
F′(b) =
N∑
i=1
ωi
Mθi3
δi
∆i[
(θi1 + θi3)eθi1b + (θi2− θi3)e−θi2b]2 ,
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where
∆i =
(
θ2i1e
θi1b− θ2i2e−θi2b
) [
(θi1 + θi3)eθi1b + (θi2− θi3)e−θi2b
]
−
(
θi1eθi1b + θi2e−θi2b
) [
θi1 (θi1 + θi3)eθi1b− θi2 (θi2− θi3)e−θi2b
]
=
[
θ2i1 (θi2− θi3)− θ2i2 (θi1 + θi3) + θi1θi2 (θi2− θi3)− θi2θi1 (θi1 + θi3)
]
e(θi1−θi2)b
= [θi1 (θi2− θi3)− θi2 (θi1 + θi3)] (θi1 + θi2)e(θi1−θi2)b
= −θi3 (θi1 + θi2)2 e(θi1−θi2)b
< 0.
Therefore, the equation F(b) = 0 admits a unique solution on (0,∞). 
Theorem 4.2. Given the discount function (4.3), there exists a smooth function c(·, ·, ·) satisfying the
equilibrium HJB-equation (3.2).
(i) If
∑N
i=1ωi
Mθi3
δi
≤ 1, then b = 0 and the function c(·, ·, ·) is given by
c(s, t, x) =
N∑
i=1
ωie−δi(t−s)
M
δi
(
1− e−θi3x
)
, x ∈ [0,∞). (4.13)
(ii) If
∑N
i=1ωi
Mθi3
δi
> 1, then
c(s, t, x) =

∑N
i=1ωie
−δi(t−s)Ci
(
eθi1x− e−θi2x
)
, x ∈ [0,b),∑N
i=1ωie
−δi(t−s)
(
M
δi
−die−θi3x
)
, x ∈ [b,∞),
(4.14)
where Ci,di, i = 1,2, · · · ,N, and b is the unique solution to the system (4.8)-(4.10).
Proof. (i) It is easy to check the function c(s, t, x) given by (4.13) and b = 0 satisfy the system of
ODEs (4.2). Obviously, we have
∂c
∂x
(s, t,0) =
N∑
i=1
ωie−δi(t−s)
M
δi
θi3 ≤ 1, (s, t) ∈ D[0,∞),
∂2c
∂x2
(s, t, x) = −
N∑
i=1
ωie−δi(t−s)
M
δi
θ2i3e
−θi3x < 0, (s, t, x) ∈ D[0,∞)× [0,∞).
Thus, ∂c∂x (t, t, x) < 1, for x ≥ 0, which implies c(·, ·, ·) satisfies the equilibrium HJB-equation (3.2).
(ii) Similarly, it is easy to check that b and c(·, ·, ·, ) given by (4.8)-(4.10) and (4.14) satisfy the
system of ODEs (4.2). It is sufficient to show
∂c
∂x (t, t, x) ≥ 1, x ∈ [0,b),
∂c
∂x (t, t, x) < 1, x ∈ [b,∞).
(4.15)
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The first and second derivatives of c(s, t, x) given by (4.14) with respective to x are
∂c
∂x
(t, t, x) =

∑N
i=1ωiCi
(
θi1eθi1x + θi2e−θi2x
)
, (t, x) ∈ [0,∞)× [0,b),∑N
i=1ωidiθi3e
−θi3x, (t, x) ∈ [0,∞)× [b,∞),
and
∂2c
∂x2
(t, t, x) =

∑N
i=1ωiCi
(
θ2i1e
θi1x− θ2i2e−θi2x
)
, (t, x) ∈ [0,∞)× [0,b),
−∑Ni=1ωidiθ2i3e−θi3x, (t, x) ∈ [0,∞)× [b,∞),
respectively.
It is easy to check that ∂c∂x (t, t, x) > 0, for all (t, x) ∈ [0,∞)× [0,∞), which implies that c(t, t, ·) is
strictly increasing. Next we show that c(t, t, ·) is a concave function on [0,∞), i.e. ∂2c
∂x2 (t, t, x) < 0,
for all (t, x) ∈ [0,∞) × [0,∞). First we show that ∂2c
∂x2 (t, t, x) is continuous at x = b. Apparently,
∂2c
∂x2 (t, t, x) < 0, for all (t, x) ∈ [0,∞)× [b,∞). Recalling (4.4), (4.5) and (4.7), we have
1
2
σ2
∂2c
∂x2
(t, t,b−) = −µ∂c
∂x
(t, t,b) +
N∑
i=1
ωiδiVi(b),
1
2
σ2
∂2c
∂x2
(t, t,b+) = − (µ−M) ∂c
∂x
(t, t,b) +
N∑
i=1
ωiδiVi(b)−M.
Since ∂c∂x (t, t,b) = 1, we get
∂2c
∂x2 (t, t,b−) = ∂
2c
∂x2 (t, t,b+) =
∂2c
∂x2 (t, t,b).
Obviously, for all 0 ≤ x ≤ b, we have
∂3c
∂x3
(t, t, x) =
N∑
i=1
ωiCi
(
θ3i1e
θi1x + θ3i2e
−θi2x) > 0,
which means that ∂
2c
∂x2 (t, t, x) ≤ ∂
2c
∂x2 (t, t,b) < 0, for all 0 ≤ x ≤ b. Thus, we proved (4.15). 
Corollary 4.3. Consider the discount function (4.3).
(i) If
∑N
i=1ωi
Mθi3
δi
≤ 1, then for t ∈ [0,∞)
pˆi(t, x) = φ
(
t, t,
∂c
∂x
(t, t, x),
∂2c
∂x2
(t, t, x)
)
= M, x ∈ [0,∞),
is an equilibrium dividend strategy, and
V(t, x) = c(t, t, x) =
N∑
i=1
ωi
M
δi
(
1− e−θi3x
)
, x ∈ [0,∞),
is the corresponding equilibrium value function.
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Figure 4.1: Equilibrium value functions with a mixture of exponential discount functions
(ii) If
∑N
i=1ωi
Mθi3
δi
> 1, then for t ∈ [0,∞)
pˆi(t, x) = φ
(
t, t,
∂c
∂x
(t, t, x),
∂2c
∂x2
(t, t, x)
)
=
0, x ∈ [0,b),M, x ∈ [b,∞),
is an equilibrium dividend strategy, and
V(t, x) = c(t, t, x) =

∑N
i=1ωiCi
(
eθi1x− e−θi2x
)
, x ∈ [0,b),∑N
i=1ωi
(
M
δi
−die−θi3x
)
, x ∈ [b,∞),
is the corresponding equilibrium value function. Here Ci,di, i = 1,2, · · · ,N, and b is the unique
solution to the system (4.8)-(4.10).
Proof. By Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 4.2, it is sufficient to verify (3.6). If M ≥ µ, in both cases (i)
and (ii), it is well known that P
(
τpˆit <∞
)
= 1 (see, e.g. Gerber and Shiu (2006)). Since c(s, t,0) = 0
for all (s, t) ∈ D[0,∞),we get (3.6). If M < µ, in both cases (i) and (ii), we have P
(
τpˆit =∞
)
> 0 and
Xpˆi
τpˆit
= +∞ on {τpˆit =∞}. However, for any s ∈ [0,∞) we have limt→∞,x→∞ c(s, t, x) = 0. Thus, we still
have (3.6). 
Example 4.4. Let N = 2, µ = 1, σ = 1, M = 0.8, δ1 = 0.2, δ2 = 0.4. Figure 4.1 illustrates the
equilibrium value functions for the mixture of exponential discount functions with ω = 0, 0.4, 0.7
and 1. The barriers are 0.6525, 0.8781, 1.0207 and 1.1452, respectively. The cases with ω = 0 and 1
are time consistent and the equilibrium strategies are optimal.
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4.2 A Pseudo-Exponential Discount Function
We now consider a pseudo-exponential discount function defined as
h(t) = (1 +λt)e−δt, t ≥ 0, (4.16)
where λ > 0, δ > 0 are parameters. We refer the reader to Ekeland and Pirvu (2008) for explana-
tions of this discount function. To ensure h is decreasing, we assume that λ < δ. To simplify the
calculations, we shall impose more conditions on λ in the following.
We consider the following ansatz:
c(s, t, x) = e−δ(t−s) {λ(t− s)V3(x) + V4(x)} , (s, t, x) ∈ D[0,∞)× [0,∞), (4.17)
where V3(·) and V4(·) are given by
1
2σ
2 ∂2V3
∂x2 (x) +µ
∂V3
∂x (x)−δV3(x) = 0, x ∈ [0,b),
1
2σ
2 ∂2V3
∂x2 (x) + (µ−M)
∂V3
∂x (x)−δV3(x) + M = 0, x ∈ [b,∞),
V3(0) = 0,
(4.18)
and 
1
2σ
2 ∂2V4
∂x2 (x) +µ
∂V4
∂x (x)−δV4(x) +λV3(x) = 0, x ∈ [0,b),
1
2σ
2 ∂2V4
∂x2 (x) + (µ−M)∂V4∂x (x)−δV4(x) +λV3(x) + M = 0, x ∈ [b,∞),
V4(0) = 0,
(4.19)
respectively. It is easy to check that the function c(·, ·, ·) given by (4.17)-(4.19) satisfies the system
(4.2).
Recalling the situation we discussed in Subsection 4.1, the equation (4.18) has a general solution
V3(x) =
C
(
eθ1(µ)x− e−θ2(µ)x
)
, x ∈ [0,b),
M
δ −de−θ2(µ−M)x, x ∈ [b,∞),
(4.20)
where C > 0, d > 0 are two unknown constants to be determined, θ1(η) and −θ2(η) are the positive
and negative roots of the equation 12σ
2y2 +ηy−δ = 0, respectively.
According to “the principle of smooth fit”, we haveV3(b+) = V3(b−),V′3(b+) = V′3(b−), (4.21)
which yields that
C =
Mθ3
δ
[
(θ1 + θ3)eθ1b + (θ2− θ3)e−θ2b
]−1
, (4.22)
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d =
M
δ
eθ3b
θ1eθ1b + θ2e−θ2b
(θ1 + θ3)eθ1b + (θ2− θ3)e−θ2b , (4.23)
where
θ1 = θ1(µ), θ2 = θ2(µ), θ3 = θ2(µ−M).
After obtaining V3, solving ODE (4.19) yields that
V4(x) =
(D1−B1x)e
θ1x + (D2 + B2x)e−θ2x, 0 ≤ x < b,
M
δ
(
1 + λδ
)
+ (D3 + B3x)e−θ3x, x ≥ b,
(4.24)
where
B1 =
λC
µ+σ2θ1
> 0, B2 =
λC
µ−σ2θ2 < 0, B3 =
λd
µ−M−σ2θ3 < 0. (4.25)
Since V4(0) = 0, we have D1 = −D2 := Cˆ. Also noting that B1 + B2 = 0, we rewrite (4.24) as
V4(x) =

(
Cˆ−B1x
)
eθ1x−
(
Cˆ + B1x
)
e−θ2x, 0 ≤ x < b,
M
δ
(
1 + λδ
)
+ (D3 + B3x)e−θ3x, x ≥ b.
(4.26)
Applying "the principle of smooth fit", we obtain
V4(b+) = V4(b−),
V′4(b+) = V
′
4(b−),
∂c
∂x (t, t,b+) = 1
(
or equavalently, ∂c∂x (t, t,b−) = 1
)
.
(4.27)
From the first two equations in (4.27), we obtain
Cˆ =
[(θ1 + θ3)b + 1] B1eθ1b− [(θ2− θ3)b−1] B1e−θ2b + B3e−θ3b + θ3
(
1 + λδ
)
M
δ
(θ1 + θ3)eθ1b + (θ2− θ3)e−θ2b , (4.28)
D3 = eθ3b
[(
Cˆ−B1b
)
eθ1b−
(
Cˆ + B1b
)
e−θ2b−
(
1 +
λ
δ
) M
δ
]
−B3b. (4.29)
Furthermore, using ∂c∂x (t, t,b+) =
∂c
∂x (t, t,b−) = 1, we have[(
Cˆ−B1b
)
θ1−B1
]
eθ1b +
[(
Cˆ + B1b
)
θ2−B1
]
e−θ2b−1 = 0, (4.30)
i.e.,
Cˆ =
1 + (θ1b + 1) B1eθ1b− (θ2b−1) B1e−θ2b
θ1eθ1b + θ2e−θ2b
,
and
(−θ3D3− θ3B3b + B3)e−θ3b−1 = 0,
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i.e.,
D3 =
1
θ3
(
B3− eθ3b
)
−B3b. (4.31)
Puting (4.28) and (4.29) into the left-hand-side of (4.30), it can be rewritten as[
(θ1 + θ3)eθ1b + (θ2− θ3)e−θ2b
]−1
G(b),
where
G(b) := −θ3B1e2θ1b + θ3B1e−2θ2b + θ1B3e(θ1−θ3)b
+θ2B3e−(θ2+θ3)b + 2(θ1 + θ2)θ3B1be(θ1−θ2)b
+
[
θ1θ3
(
1 +
λ
δ
) M
δ
− (θ1 + θ3)
]
eθ1b
+
[
θ2θ3
(
1 +
λ
δ
) M
δ
− (θ2− θ3)
]
e−θ2b, (4.32)
and
G(0) = (θ1 + θ2)
{[
λ
µ−M−σ2θ3 + θ3
(
1 +
λ
δ
)] M
δ
−1
}
.
Lemma 4.5. If
δ
M − θ3
1
µ−M−σ2θ3 +
θ3
δ
< λ <
(θ1 + θ3)
[
δ
M (θ1 + θ3)− θ1θ3
]
θ21
(
1
µ−M−σ2θ3 +
θ3
δ
)
+ θ23
(
θ1
δ − 1µ+σ2θ1
) , (4.33)
then G(b) = 0 has a positive solution.
The proof of Lemma 4.5 is shown in Appendix A. Now we show the main result of this subsection
in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.6. Assume that 0 < λ < δ. Given the discount function (4.16), there exists a smooth
function c(·, ·, ·) satisfying the equilibrium HJB-equation (3.2).
(i) If δM > θ3 and λ ≤
(
δ
M − θ3
) [
1
µ−M−σ2θ3 +
θ3
δ
]−1
, then b = 0 and c(·, ·, ·) is given by (4.17) with
V3(x) =
M
δ
(
1− e−θ3x
)
, x ∈ [0,∞),
V4(x) =
(
1 +
λ
δ
) M
δ
+
M
δ
[
λ
µ−M−σ2θ3 x−
(
1 +
λ
δ
)]
e−θ3x, x ∈ [0,∞). (4.34)
(ii) If (4.33) and (B.1) hold, then c(·, ·, ·) is given by (4.17) with
V3(x) =
C
(
eθ1x− e−θ2x
)
, x ∈ [0,b),
M
δ −de−θ3x, x ∈ [b,∞),
V4(x) =

(
Cˆ−B1x
)
eθ1x−
(
Cˆ + B1x
)
e−θ2x, 0 ≤ x < b,(
1 + λδ
)
M
δ + (D3 + B3x)e
−θ3x, x ∈ [b,∞),
(4.35)
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where
(
b,C,d,Cˆ,B1,B3,D3
)
is a solution to (4.21) and (4.27).
Proof. It is easy to check that the function c(·, ·, ·) given by (4.17)-(4.19) satisfies the system (4.2).
To prove c(·, ·, ·) satisfies the equilibrium HJB-equation (3.2), it is sufficient to show
∂c
∂x (t, t, x) ≥ 1, x ∈ [0,b),
∂c
∂x (t, t, x) < 1, x ∈ [b,∞).
(4.36)
(i) Firstly, we show that the function V4 defined by (4.34) is a concave function. Recalling
Lemma A.1 and λ > 0, we obtain
V′4(x) =
M
δ
(
λ
µ−M−σ2θ3 + θ3
(
1 +
λ
δ
)
− θ3 λ
µ−M−σ2θ3 x
)
e−θ3x
≥ M
δ
(
λ
µ−M−σ2θ3 + θ3
(
1 +
λ
δ
))
e−θ3x
=
M
δ
[(
1
µ−M−σ2θ3 +
θ3
δ
)
λ+ θ3
]
e−θ3x > 0.
Also note that V3(0) = V4(0) = 0 and V′4(0) =
[
λ
µ−M−σ2θ3 + θ3
(
1 + λδ
)]
M
δ ∈ (0,1]. Recalling the second
equation of (4.19), we have
1
2
σ2V′′4 (0) = − (µ−M)V′4(0) +δV4(0)−λV3(0)−M
= − (µ−M)V′4(0)−M
= −µV′4(0) + M
(
V′4(0)−1
)
< 0.
Thus,
V′′4 (x) = −θ3
M
δ
(
2λ
µ−M−σ2θ3 + θ3
(
1 +
λ
δ
)
− θ3 λ
µ−M−σ2θ3 x
)
e−θ3x
=
[
V′′4 (0) + θ
2
3
M
δ
λ
µ−M−σ2θ3 x
]
e−θ3x < 0.
Therefore ∂c∂x (t, t, x) = V
′
4(x) ≤ 1 for all x > 0.
(ii) For x ≥ b, recalling (4.31),
V′4(x) = (−θ3D3 + B3− θ3B3x)e−θ3x
≥ (−θ3D3 + B3− θ3B3b)e−θ3x
= − [θ3 (D3 + B3b)−B3]e−θ3x
= eθ3(b−x) > 0,
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and
V′′4 (x) = θ3 (θ3D3−2B3 + θ3B3x)e−θ3x
≤ θ3 [θ3 (D3 + B3b)−2B3]e−θ3x
= θ3
(
−B3− eθ3b
)
e−θ3x
< θ3
(
− λ
µ−M−σ2θ3
M
δ
−1
)
eθ3(b−x)
≤ θ3
(
θ3
M
δ
λ
δ
−1
)
eθ3(b−x).
The last inequality follows from Lemma A.1. Furthermore, by (B.1), we have θ3 Mδ
λ
δ −1 ≤ 0. There-
fore, V′′4 (x) < 0, for x ≥ b.
Now we see the case when 0 ≤ x < b. It follows from (4.19) and (4.27) that
1
2
σ2V′′4 (b−) = −µV′4(b) +δV4(b)−λV3(b),
1
2
σ2V′′4 (b+) = − (µ−M)V′4(b) +δV4(b)−λV3(b)−M
= −µV′4(b) +δV4(b)−λV3(b),
which yields that V′′4 (b+) = V
′′
4 (b−) = V′′4 (b). Furthermore, for 0 ≤ x < b,
V′′′4 (x) = θ
2
1
[
θ1Cˆ−3B1− θ1B1x
]
eθ1x + θ22
[
θ2Cˆ−3B1 + θ2B1x
]
e−θ2x
> θ21
[
θ1Cˆ−3B1− θ1B1b
]
eθ1x + θ22
[
θ2Cˆ−3B1
]
e−θ2x.
It follows from Lemma B.2 that if (B.1) holds, then V′′′4 (x) > 0 for 0 ≤ x < b. Since V′′4 (x) is
continuous at x = b and V′′4 (b) < 0, we get that V
′′
4 (x) < 0, for 0 ≤ x < b. Therefore, c(t, t, x) = V4(x)
is a concave function on (0,∞), which together with (4.27) implies (4.36). 
Similar to the proof of Corollary 4.3, it is easy to verify (3.6). We have the following corollary
immediately by Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 4.6.
Corollary 4.7. Assume that 0 < λ < δ. Consider the discount function (4.16).
(i) If δM > θ3 and λ ≤
(
δ
M − θ3
) [
1
µ−M−σ2θ3 +
θ3
δ
]−1
, then for (t, x) ∈ [0,∞)× [0,∞),
pˆi(t, x) = φ
(
t, t,
∂c
∂x
(t, t, x),
∂2c
∂x2
(t, t, x)
)
= M,
is an equilibrium dividend strategy, and
V(t, x) = c(t, t, x) =
(
1 +
λ
δ
) M
δ
+
M
δ
[
λ
µ−M−σ2θ3 x−
(
1 +
λ
δ
)]
e−θ3x,
is the corresponding equilibrium value function.
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Figure 4.2: Equilibrium value functions with a pseudo-exponential discount function
(ii) If (4.33) and (B.1) hold, then for t ∈ [0,∞),
pˆi(t, x) = φ
(
t, t,
∂c
∂x
(t, t, x),
∂2c
∂x2
(t, t, x)
)
=
0, x ∈ [0,b),M, x ∈ [b,∞),
is an equilibrium dividend strategy, and
V(t, x) = c(t, t, x) =

(
Cˆ−B1x
)
eθ1x−
(
Cˆ + B1x
)
e−θ2x, x ∈ [0,b),(
1 + λδ
)
M
δ + (D3 + B3x)e
−θ3x, x ∈ [b,∞),
is the corresponding equilibrium value function. Here
(
b,Cˆ,B1,B3,D3
)
is the solution to
(4.27).
Example 4.8. Let µ = 1, σ = 1, M = 1, δ = 0.8. Figure 4.2 shows the equilibrium value functions for
pseudo-exponential discount functions with λ= 0, 0.1 and 0.2. The barriers b are 0.3470, 0.4141 and
0.4796, respectively. The case with λ = 0 is time consistent and the equilibrium strategy is optimal.
Appendix A
Lemma A.1. θ1δ − 1µ+σ2θ1 > 0 and
1
µ−M−σ2θ3 +
θ3
δ > 0.
Proof. Recall that θ1 and θ3 are given by
θ1 =
−µ+ √µ2 + 2σ2δ
σ2
, θ3 =
µ−M +
√
(µ−M)2 + 2σ2δ
σ2
.
20
Then it follows that
θ1
δ
− 1
µ+σ2θ1
=− 1√
µ2 + 2σ2δ
+
−µ+ √µ2 + 2σ2δ
σ2δ
=
(
−µ+ √µ2 + 2σ2δ) √µ2 + 2σ2δ−σ2δ
σ2δ
√
µ2 + 2σ2δ
=
−2
√
2
2 µ
√
1
2µ
2 +σ2δ+
[
1
2µ
2 +σ2δ
]
+ 12µ
2
σ2δ
√
µ2 + 2σ2δ
=
[ √
2
2 µ−
√
1
2µ
2 +σ2δ
]2
σ2δ
√
µ2 + 2σ2δ
> 0,
and
1
µ−M−σ2θ3 +
θ3
δ
=− 1√
(µ−M)2 + 2σ2δ
+
µ−M +
√
(µ−M)2 + 2σ2δ
σ2δ
=
(
µ−M +
√
(µ−M)2 + 2σ2δ
) √
(µ−M)2 + 2σ2δ−σ2δ
σ2δ
√
(µ−M)2 + 2σ2δ
=
2
√
2
2 (µ−M)
√
1
2 (µ−M)2 +σ2δ+
[
1
2 (µ−M)2 +σ2δ
]
+ 12 (µ−M)2
σ2δ
√
(µ−M)2 + 2σ2δ
=
[ √
2
2 (µ−M) +
√
1
2 (µ−M)2 +σ2δ
]2
σ2δ
√
(µ−M)2 + 2σ2δ
> 0.

Proof of Lemma 4.5. It is easy to check that
G(0) = (θ1 + θ2)
{
λ
[
1
µ−M−σ2θ3 +
θ3
δ
]
M
δ
+ θ3
M
δ
−1
}
By Lemma A.1 and (4.33) we have G(0) > 0. Now by (4.22), (4.23) and (4.25), we rewrite G(b) as
G(b) = θ3
λ
µ+σ2θ1
Mθ3
δ
1
(θ1 + θ3)eθ1b + (θ2− θ3)e−θ2b
(
−e2θ1b + e−2θ2b
)
+
λ
µ−M−σ2θ3
M
δ
1
(θ1 + θ3)eθ1b + (θ2− θ3)e−θ2b
(
θ1eθ1b + θ2e−θ2b
)2
+2(θ1 + θ2)θ3
λ
µ+σ2θ1
Mθ3
δ
1
(θ1 + θ3)eθ1b + (θ2− θ3)e−θ2b be
(θ1−θ2)b
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+[
θ1θ3
(
1 +
λ
δ
) M
δ
− (θ1 + θ3)
]
eθ1b +
[
θ2θ3
(
1 +
λ
δ
) M
δ
− (θ2− θ3)
]
e−θ2b
:=
1
(θ1 + θ3)eθ1b + (θ2− θ3)e−θ2b g(b),
where
g(b) :=2(θ1 + θ2)θ3
λ
µ+σ2θ1
Mθ3
δ
be(θ1−θ2)b
+ e2θ1b
− λµ+σ2θ1 Mθ
2
3
δ
+
λ
µ−M−σ2θ3
Mθ21
δ
+
[
θ1θ3
(
1 +
λ
δ
) M
δ
− (θ1 + θ3)
]
(θ1 + θ3)

+ e(θ1−θ2)b
{
2θ1θ2
λ
µ−M−σ2θ3
M
δ
+
[
θ1θ3
(
1 +
λ
δ
) M
δ
− (θ1 + θ3)
]
(θ2− θ3)
+
[
θ2θ3
(
1 +
λ
δ
) M
δ
− (θ2− θ3)
]
(θ1 + θ3)
}
+ e−2θ2b
 λµ+σ2θ1 Mθ
2
3
δ
+
λ
µ−M−σ2θ3
Mθ22
δ
+
[
θ2θ3
(
1 +
λ
δ
) M
δ
− (θ2− θ3)
]
(θ2− θ3)

=2(θ1 + θ2)θ3
λ
µ+σ2θ1
Mθ3
δ
be(θ1−θ2)b
+ e2θ1b
{
λ
M
δ
[
θ23
(
− 1
µ+σ2θ1
+
θ1
δ
)
+ θ21
(
1
µ−M−σ2θ3 +
θ3
δ
)]
+ θ1θ3 (θ1 + θ3)
(
M
δ
− 1
θ3
− 1
θ1
)}
+ e(θ1−θ2)b
{
λ
M
δ
[
2θ1θ2
1
µ−M−σ2θ3 + θ3 (2θ1θ2− θ1θ3 + θ2θ3)
1
δ
]
+θ3
M
δ
(2θ1θ2− θ1θ3 + θ2θ3)−2(θ2− θ3) (θ1 + θ3)
}
+ e−2θ2b
{
λ
M
δ
[
θ23
(
1
µ+σ2θ1
− θ2
δ
)
+ θ22
(
1
µ−M−σ2θ3 +
θ3
δ
)]
+ (θ2− θ3)
[
θ2θ3
M
δ
− (θ2− θ3)
]}
.
From Lemma 2.1 of Asmussen and Taksar (1997), we have
M
δ
− 1
θ3
− 1
θ1
< 0.
By Lemma A.1 and (4.33), it is easy to see that G(∞) < 0. Thus, the equation G(b) = 0 admits a
positive solution. 
Appendix B
Lemma B.2. If
λ ≤ θ1 + θ2
θ1 + 3θ2
δ2
Mθ3
∧ (θ1 + θ3) (θ1 + θ2)
2θ1 (θ1 + 2θ2)
δ2
Mθ3
, (B.1)
then
θ1Cˆ−3B1− θ1B1b > 0.
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Proof. It follows that
θ1Cˆ−3B1− θ1B1b
=
θ1−2θ1θ2bB1e−θ2b−2B1θ1eθ1b + B1 (θ1−3θ2)e−θ2b
θ1eθ1b + θ2e−θ2b
=
θ1 + B1
[
−2θ1eθ1b + (−2θ1θ2b + θ1−3θ2)e−θ2b
]
θ1eθ1b + θ2e−θ2b
=
θ1
[
θ1 + θ3−2 λµ+σ2θ1
Mθ3
δ
]
e(θ1+θ2)b +
[
θ1 (θ2− θ3) + λµ+σ2θ1
Mθ3
δ (−2θ1θ2b + θ1−3θ2)
]
eθ2b
(
θ1eθ1b + θ2e−θ2b
) [
(θ1 + θ3)eθ1b + (θ2− θ3)e−θ2b] . (B.2)
Let
q(b) := θ1
[
θ1 + θ3−2 λ
µ+σ2θ1
Mθ3
δ
]
e(θ1+θ2)b +
[
θ1 (θ2− θ3) + λ
µ+σ2θ1
Mθ3
δ
(−2θ1θ2b + θ1−3θ2)
]
.
Then
q′(b) = θ1 (θ1 + θ2)
[
θ1 + θ3−2 λ
µ+σ2θ1
Mθ3
δ
]
e(θ1+θ2)b−2θ1θ2 λ
µ+σ2θ1
Mθ3
δ
,
q′′(b) = θ1 (θ1 + θ2)2
[
θ1 + θ3−2 λ
µ+σ2θ1
Mθ3
δ
]
e(θ1+θ2)b,
and
q(0) = θ1
[
θ1 + θ3−2 λ
µ+σ2θ1
Mθ3
δ
]
+ θ1 (θ2− θ3) + λ
µ+σ2θ1
Mθ3
δ
(θ1−3θ2)
= θ1 (θ1 + θ2)− (θ1 + 3θ2) λ
µ+σ2θ1
Mθ3
δ
,
q′(0) = θ1 (θ1 + θ2)
[
θ1 + θ3−2 λ
µ+σ2θ1
Mθ3
δ
]
−2 λ
µ+σ2θ1
Mθ3
δ
θ1θ2
= θ1 (θ1 + θ2) (θ1 + θ3)−2θ1 (θ1 + 2θ2) λ
µ+σ2θ1
Mθ3
δ
.
If λ ≤ θ1+θ2θ1+3θ2 δ
2
Mθ3
∧ (θ1+θ3)(θ1+θ2)2θ1(θ1+2θ2) δ
2
Mθ3
holds, then it follows from Lemma A.1 that
q(0) = (θ1 + θ2)
[
θ1− θ1 + 3θ2
θ1 + θ2
λ
µ+σ2θ1
Mθ3
δ
]
≥ δ (θ1 + θ2)
(
θ1
δ
− 1
µ+σ2δ
)
> 0.
and similarly,
q′(0) = (θ1 + θ2) (θ1 + θ3)
[
θ1− 2θ1 (θ1 + 2θ2)(θ1 + θ2) (θ1 + θ3)
λ
µ+σ2θ1
Mθ3
δ
]
≥ δ (θ1 + θ2) (θ1 + θ3)
(
θ1
δ
− 1
µ+σ2δ
)
> 0.
23
Thus, it follows from q′(0) ≥ 0 that
θ1 (θ1 + θ2)
[
θ1 + θ3−2 λ
µ+σ2θ1
Mθ3
δ
]
≥ 2 λ
µ+σ2θ1
Mθ3
δ
θ1θ2 > 0.
Therefore, q′′(b) > 0, q′(b) > 0, and then q(b) > 0. Finally, it follows from (B.2) that
θ1Cˆ−3B1− θ1B1b > 0.

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